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ABSTRACT 
The European Union (EU) Directive against racial and ethnic origin discrimina- 
tion has been criticized for a number of rcasons. The main ones are, firstly, that 
it places racial and ethnic origin at the top of the hierarchy of discrimination 
grounds in the EU and that it does not cover discrimination on the grounds of 
religion or belief; secondly, that its main aim appears to be to establish formal 
equality or equal treatment rather than a more substantive form of equality; 
and, thirdly, that it gives only limited protection to third country nationals 
(nationals of non-EU Member States), In this paper a number of changes to the 
Directive are suggested in order to make it into a more effective tool in the fight 
against racism and racial and ethnic origin discrimination. 
INTRODUCTION 
I11 June 2000, the EU adopted the Race Directive,' a Directive 
against discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin. It 
was the first legislative measure taken by the EU in the fight against 
racism and racial discrimination. Tn the same year, the EU also 
adopted a Directive against discrimination on the grounds of religion 
or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation2 and an Action Pro- 
gramme to combat di~crimination.~ These measures were all taken 
on the basis of Article 13 EC, which was inserted in the EC Treaty 
by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997 and provided the conlpetence 
for the EU to adopt legislation against discrimination on the grounds 
of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age and 
sexual orientation. Nationality discrimination was already prohib- 
ited by Article 12 EC, while discrinlillation on the ground of sex 
has been prohibited in a number of Directives adopted since 1975 .~  
The main Directive against sex discrimination, the Equal Treatment 
Directive, was amended in 200z5 to bring it more in line with the 2000 
Directivcs. 111 2004, the EU adopted a Directive to extend the protec- 
tion against sex discrimination to the access to and the supply of 
goods and ser~ ices .~  Together, these Directives provide protection 
against discrimination on all the grounds of Article 13 EC. However, 
the protection against: discrimination is not the same f'or the different 
gounds of discrimination. 
In this paper, a number of-changes, to be made to the Race 
Directive, are proposed in order to inalce it into a more effective 
tool to combat racism and racial and ethnic origin discrimination 
in the EU. Changes will only be suggested in relation to the 
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I , I  # l !  Goods and Services Directives - because this provides the context 
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'l:,l in which the Race Directive must be placed: the Equal Treatment 
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; ; i l , l  Directive and the case law of the ECJ in relation to sex discrimina- l,!! tion have influenced the Race and Framework Directives, which, ))I/' 
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in their turn, have influenced the Gender Amendment and the 
(iili; ' Race Directive and, due to linlitations of space, not in relation 
111 ,'m, Goods and Service Directives. After the overview, the major points i,!!;~; of criticism directed at the Race Directive will be discussed and 11 this is followed by suggestions on how to improve the Directive in light of these. 
The changes suggested are inspired by and based on inter- 
;;, national measures against racial discrimination like the Inter- 
national Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial p: 'l! 
/ I' Discrimination (ICERD) and General Recomlnendation No. 7 of 
l i '  the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRS),~ a body of the Council of Europe specifically appointed ifl' to deal with racism and racial discrimillation. 111 this Recornrnexida- 
l i ' !  tion, ECRI recommends that the Member States of the Coullcil of I Europe enact legislation against racism and racial discrimination 
and gives key components of such legislation. As all 25 Member 
States of the EU have signed and ratified the ICERD and are 
Members of the Council of Europe, it appears logical to look at 
these instruments for guidance. 
Two points relating to the character of the Race Directive need 
to be kept in mind in this discussion: firstly, it is a EU measure, and as 
such it needs to conform to the principles of subsidiarity and propor- 
, tionality laid down in Article 5 EC. According to Recital 28 of tlie 
l to the other Equality Directives, altlnough many of tlne proposed changes could also be made in the same way to those other Direc- l l ~ ' ~  tives. This is based on the opinion that all four Directives, and possible future Directives adopted on the basis of Article 13 EC, 111 should, wherever possible, contain the same definitions, provisions 1 1 ,  and exceptions and unnecessary differences in wording should be 1)' i avoided, as this would only create confusion and make interpreta- 1 tion more difficult. 
,l! The first part of the paper contains an overview of the differ- 
,,[;; (! ences in protection provided by the different Equality Directives - 
,, ';l 8 1 ,  the Equal Treatment, Race, Framework, Gender Amendment and 
Race Directive, the principle'of subsidiarity is adhered to, because. 
action by the Coiiimunity is necessary to achieve a common high 
level of protection against discrimination in all the Member States. 
The proportionality principle does require that tliis action should 
not go beyond what is necessary to achieve this objective. 
Secondly, a Directive is, accordiiig to Article 149 EC, binding 
upon the Member States as to the results to be achieved, but leaves 
the choice of form and methods to the national authorities. There- 
fore, there are limits to what the EU can do. 
DIFFERENCES IN LEVEL OF PROTECTION PROVIDED 
Together, the Equality Directives provide protection against disci-i- 
inination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, rel.igion 
and belief, disability, age and sexual orientation, but the protection 
is iiot the same for the different grounds of discrimination. One of 
the main differences between the Directives is their inaterial scope. 
The Framework Directive prohibits discriininatioil on the grounds 
of religion 01- belief, disability, age and sexual orientation in the 
following areas: access to employment; access to training; einploy- 
merit conditions; and, membership of professional organisations. 
The legislative protection against sex discriinination under the 
Equal Treatment and Gender Amendment Directives covers these 
same areas, but the protection was extended by the Goods and 
Services Directive to include the access to and the supply of goods 
and services. However, the Race Directive prohibits discrimiiiatioin 
on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin not only in all the areas 
covered by the above Directives, but also in the areas of social pro- 
tection, which includes social security and health care, social advan- 
tages and education. The inaterial scope of the Race Directive is, 
thus, much wider than that of the other Directives, aiid this is one 
of the strong features of the Race Directive. 
Another feature which lilakes the protection against racial or 
ethnic origin disc~imination stronger than the protection against 
discrimination on the grounds covered by the Franlework Directive 
is that the Race Directive allows for justification of direct discrimina- 
tion only in very liinited and prescribed circumstances: for genuine 
and determining occupational requirements (Article 4) and for 
positive action measures (Article 5). Direct racial or etlzilic origin 
discri~~liilation cannot be justified under any other circumstances. 
With regards to sex discriiiiiiiatioii, a distiilctioil must be made 
between the areas covered by the Gender -Amendment Directive - 
i.e. the eniployinent sphere - where also only very limited exceptions 
are allowed; and, the access to and supply of goods and services, 
proposed. The main, poiiits of criticism raised against the Race 
Directive are discussed first. 
POINTS OF CRITICISM 
Grounds for Discrimination 
EU anti discrimination measures have been criticised for creating a 
hierarchy of discrimination grounds,'2 because, as already men- 
tioned, the protectioil provided against discrimination on the 
grounds of racial or ethnic origin is stronger than that provided 
against discrimination on the other Article l 3  EC grounds. The 
omission of religion or belief as a discrimination ground in the 
Race Directive is seen as especially problematic13 because, firstly, 
religion is often closely related to racial and ethnic origin, so it can 
be difficult to distinguish between the two. Racial discrimillation 
1 
may be closely connected with discrimination on grounds of a 
1 b
person's religion or ethnicity. And, secondly, limiting the protection 
i against religious discrimination to the area of employinent - as it is 
1 under the Framework Directive - while the protection against 
i racial and ethnic disci-imiiiation covers a much wider area might create a loophole: perpetrators could claim that they discriminate against victims because of their religion rather than because of 
their racial oi- ethnic origin and so evade legal action. l  
l hTotions of Equality 
The Race Directive has also been criticised for mainly aiming to 
establish formal. equality or equal treatment rather than a more 
substantive foim of equality that takes account of the disadvantages 
and inequalities that seine groups in society face as the results of past 
and on-going discrimination. And, even where it goes some way 
towards a more substantive notion of equality -. in prohibiting I 
indirect discrimination and allowing positive action measures - it is 
criticised for not going far enough. But what do the terms 'formal i 
equality' and 'substantive equality' mean in relation to measures 
against discrimination? And, is the term 'equality7 used in any 
other way?14 I 
Formal equality, or equal treatment, is grounded in the principle 11 i 
that like should be treated alike and that everyone has a right to be 'I 
treated like anyone else in the-same situation. Anti discrimination 
legisla~io~i which aims at formal equality, would prescribe equal 
1 
l 
i treatment of persons in the -same or very similar situations. The il 
I 
. . 
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definition of direct discriminatior, in Article 2(2)(a) of the Race 
Directive is a good example: 
Direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is 
treated less favourably than another is. has been or would be treated, 
in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic origin. 
There are, however, a number of problems with this concept. Firstly, 
the concept of formal equality relies on a comparator: is a person 
treated unequally compared to another person in the same situation? 
But, who is like who? The choice of a comparator can influence the 
outcome. Secondly, the notion that like should be treated alike, 
negates the value of difference and assumes sameness and, therefore, 
leaves no room for any recognition of the positive aspects of differ- 
ence or for a requirement t l ~a t  people should be treated appropriately 
according to their differences. Thirdly, the notion of formal equality 
ignores any existing inequalities and social disadvantages. It does not 
loolc a t  any imbalances that have been created by past discrimina- 
tion. The fourth problem with the notion of formal equality is that 
it is a relative concept, that it  does not guarantee a pal-ticular 
outcome. The law is complied with as long as two like persons are 
treated equally, and it does not make any difference if they are 
treated equally well or equally bad.1~. The concept allows for 
levelling-down (where both people compared are deprived of a 
benefit) as well as levelling-up (where the benefit is conferred on 
both of them). 
Because formal equality is perceived as not touching the sub- 
stantive inequalities that exist in most societies, or even as reinforcing 
these, a more substantive equality, which is sensitive to the effects of 
past and ongoing discrimination, is put forward. Substantive 
equality aims to compeilsate for the social disadvantages and 
inequalities suffered by certain groups. Anti discrimination measures 
aiming for substantive equality will allow unequal treatment of dis- 
advantaged groups where that is necessary to achieve equality in 
fact. An example call be found in Article 5 of the Race Directive, 
entitled 'Positive Action': 
I !  With a view to ensuring full equality in practice, the principle of equal treatment shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or 
l adopting specific measures to prevent or compensate for disadvan- 
1'. 
tages linked to racial or ethnic origin. 
' l  Within the concept of substantive equality two types can be dis- 
tinguished: equality of opportunity and equality of results. The 
notion of equality of opportunity concentrates on equalising the 
starting point for all, on giving everyone the same opportunities. 
This approach may well involve unequal treatment and unequal 
Gn;rl-.:nrr - * - - - d . ,  I - - , , . .  
Ll l l l i )LLLl lg  p ~ ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ,  v c ~ a u s e  i i  is 11oL concerned with the end result, but 
only aims to make the starting point equal for all. Equality of oppor- 
tunity recognises that the effects of past discrimination can make it 
very difficult for members of particular groups to even reach a situa- 
tion of 'being alike' so that the right to like treatment becomes 
applicable. 
The notion of equality of results aims to equalise the outcome or 
result. It is based on a system of justice wlich coilcentrates on 
correcting maldistribution and takes account of past or present dis- 
crimination. Its aim is thus redistributive. 
The Race Directive does not give any indication as to what sort 
of positive action is allowed and how far this action can go. The case 
law on positive action in relation to sex discri~nination shows rlnat the 
ECJ sees positive action as a derogation from the principle of equal 
treatment and as such it should be interpreted stricl;ly.15 Under 
Article 2(4) of the Equal Treatment DirectiveI6 and Article 141(4) 
EC which both allow for positive action measures in relation to 
women, the ECJ will not allow measures that give automatic prefer- 
ential treatment to women at the point of selection for employment. 
It has also held that positive measures should be limited to the period 
necessary to overcoine the disadvantage.17 As Poiares Maduro 
writes: 'the case law of the ECJ regarding affirmative action measul-es 
has therefore been framed largely by the notion of equality of oppor- 
tunities'.ls This has been cl-iticised for not going far enough towards 
remedying existing inequalities in society. 
Apart from the formal and substantive notiolis of equality, there 
is also a pluralist approach to equality, in which the positive aspects 
of difference and diversity are recognised and celebrated and people 
are treated with equal respect and in accordance with their own 
req uirenlents and aspirations. 
Scope 
Both the material and the personal scope of the Race Directive call 
be found in Article 3. However, there are three problems with this 
Article: firstly, what is meant by the opening sentence: 'within the 
limits of the powers conferred upon the Community'? A similar 
sentence can be found in Article 13 EC and there appear to be two 
possible legal positio~ls on the meaning of this sentence in that 
AI-ticle.'%ost leading colnnlentators hold that the powers under 
that Article can only be used in areas which are already regulated 
by Cornmu~lity law or so closely attached to such areas as to make 
it necessary to rcgulate them. In other words, this sentence means 
that the power 'is subject to the lin~its of the existing Com~nunity 
c~rn~e tenc ies ' , '~  so 'the Community does not enjoy competence to 
regulate any discrinlination The second view, which is 
the view of the Starting Line Group and Chopin and ~ i e s s e n , ~ ~  is 
that Article 13 gives an autonomous power, but, in exercising that 
power, the Community must act in accordance with the procedural 
powers a t  its disposal. As Article 3(1) of the Race Directive uses 
the same words as Article 13, there is no reason why the above dis- 
cussion should not also be applicable to Article 3(1). The correct 
interpretation of this sentence is thus not clear and it will ultimately 
be up to the ECJ to clarify this. 
Secondly, the Race Directive shall apply to 'all persons'. This 
suggests that third country nationals are also protected, which 
would fit in with the explicit statement in Recital 3 of the Preamble 
that 'the right to equality before the law and protection against dis- 
crimination for all persons constitutes a universal right'. However, 
Article 3(2) appears to limit the protection afforded to third country 
nationals against racial discrimination. It  reads: 
This Directive does not cover difference of treatment based on 
nationality and is without prejudice to provisions and conditions 
relating to the entry into and residence of third-country nationals 
and stateless persons on the territory of the Member States, and to 
any treatment which arises from the legal status of the third-country 
nationals and stateless persons concerned. 
Recital 13 determines that discrimination under the Directive 'should 
be prohibited throughout the Community'. It then adds: 
This prohibition of discrimination should also apply to nationals of 
third countries, but does not cover differences of treatment based on 
nationality and is without prejudice to provisions governing the 
entry and residence of third-country nationals and their access to 
employment and to occupation. 
The Race Directive makes an exception for discrimination on 
grounds of nationality because this is, as mentioned, prohibited 
under Article l2  EC rather than under Article 13 EC, which forms 
the basis for the Directive. However, there are two problems with 
this. Firstly, it is not always easy to distinguish discrimination on 
grounds of racial or P!'-nic origin from nationality discrimination. 
And, secondly, Article 12. does not apply to third country nationals, 
so they are not protected against nationality discrimination under 
that Article. Paragraph 2 was not present in either the original or 
the amended proposals for the Race Directive, but was added, 
together with Recital 13, after much discussion during the negotia- 
tions. Some Member States were concerned about preserving their 
immigration and asylum systems. The Commission argued that 
admission policies were not included in the matel-ial scope of the 
Directive, but this did not satisfy ail IvIember Stales anid in i:ic eild it 
was agreed that Article 3(2) and Recital 13 would be added.'3 This 
suggests that the Race Directive applies to non-EU natioilals and 
thus protects them against racial and ethnic discrimination, except 
in relation to immigration laws or other legal acts covering entry, 
residence and legal status. 
Thil-dly, the meaning of 'public bodies' is not clear. AI-e the 
activities of the police, law enforcement officials, border conti-01 
officials, prison personnel and the military included under 'public 
bodies7? It is not completely clear if they are. Bell writes that: 
. . . discrimination on grounds of racial and ethnic origin (. . .) is 
forbidden in all forms of employment, whether public or private. 
This means that whereas the Directive does not apply to the police 
in terms of their administration of law enforcement, it does apply to 
matters such as police re~ruitrnent.'~ 
However, Brown2%rgues that the Directive does not expressly 
provide for tackling 'institutionalized racism7," but that the ECJ 
could either define 'disci-imination based on racial or ethnic origin' 
as including 'institutionalized racism7; 01- it could define 'access to 
and supply of goods and services which are available to the public' 
as catching bodies such as the police and other  institution^.^^ It is, 
according to Bi-own, at least arguable that this phrase catches the 
police service. He concludes that, 'by including the police and 
other such bodies, a powerful message will be sent to racial and 
ethnic minorities that no such discrimination, regardless of the 
perpetrator, will be condoned.. .'. Turning this around: by not or 
only partially including the police and other such bodies a very 
negative message W-ould be sent out. 
The Race Directive also mentions 'social protection' and 'social 
advantages'. The latter should, according to the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Proposal for the Directive, be given the same 
iilterpretatioil as that given by the ECJ in relation to Regulation 
(EEC) 1618168: they are 'benefits of an economic or cultural 
nature which are granted within the Member States by public 
authorities 01- private organizations'." Perhaps some functions of 
the police, law enforcement officials, border control officials, the 
army and prison person~~el outside the employei-/employee relation- 
ship could be considered to fall under 'social protection' or 'social 
advantages'? 
The above suggests that at least some activities of these bodies 
fall under the Directive: they appear to be covered in areas such as 
elnployment and training, but the situation is un,clear wjth regard 
to the exercise of their law enforcement and other duties, although 
these might be included under Article 3(l)(e), (f) or (h). 
These are the main points of criticism directed at the Race 
Directive. The next part will contain suggestions for changes to the 
Directive to deal with the criticisms. 
PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 
Changes to the Grounds for Discrimination 
As the Race Directive already provides stronger protection against 
discrimination on the grounds of racial and etliilic origin and level- 
ling down is prohibited, this Directive would not need to be changed 
to deal with the problem of a hierarchy of discrimination grounds at 
EU level. The protection under the other Equality Directives could 
be extended to the same areas covered by the Race Directive, but dis- 
cussion of this would go beyond the subject of this paper.29 
The simplest way of dealing with the problem of the omission of 
'religion or belief' from the grounds covered by the Race Directive 
would be to add 'religion or belicf', so that the purpose of the Race 
Directive would be to lay down a framework for combating discrimina- 
tion on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin and religion or belief. T h s  
would alleviate both problenls mentioned above: no distinction would 
have to be made between these grounds and perpetrators would not be 
able to avoid legal action. Another solution which would deal in 
particular with the second problem would be to follow the amendment 
to Article 2. suggested by the European Parliament: 
Discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin which is pre- 
sented as a difference in treatment on the grounds of religion, convic- 
tion or nationality is deemed to be discrimination within the meaning 
of Article 1 .30 
Changes in Relation to the Notions of Equality 
Above, we have distinguished different notions of equality. Accord- 
ing to  redm man,^' 
at least three functions are required of equality if it is 10 begin to 
coinbat racism: first, a means of redressing racist sti-ma, stereotyping, 
humiliation and violence; secondly, the redistributive aim of breaking 
the cycle of disadvantage associated with groups defined by race or 
ethnicity; and thirdly, the positive affirmation and accolnmodation 
of difference as a part of the right to equal concern and respect. 
These three functions each correspolid to the notions of equality 
distinguished earlier: tlie first to formal equality: equal treatment 
wiiti~out di5erentiating op tine grouild of racii-ti or 'ethnic origin. The 
second function corresponds to substailtivc equality in both its 
forms, while the third corresponds wit11 a pluralist notion of equality. 
This suggests that equality in all its types is needed to fight racism 
and racial discrimination. The Race Directive's prohibition of 
direct discrimination, of unequal treatment, perforills the first func- 
tion mentioned by Fredman and, as such, it is u se f~~ l  because it makes 
clear that behaviour in which racial prejudice finds expression will 
not be tolerated. 
The Race Directive's title and its stated purpose (Article l )  
mention the principle of equal treatment. It might be better to replace 
this with the 'principle of equality' for two reasons. Firstly, the 
priilciple of equality is, according to the case law of the ECJ, a 
fundamental principle of Community law. For example, in the 
Fi-illi v. Belgiu??~ case, the ECJ stated that equality of treatment is 
'one of the fundamental principles of Community law'.32 And, in 
the Kul-issun casej3 the ECJ held that the fundamental rights in the 
Corninunity legal order 'include a general principle of equality and 
the obligation not to discriminate'. The general principles of Com- 
munity law are binding on the Community Institutions and the 
primary source of guidance on which pri~~ciples are to be considered 
as general principles of Corninunity law is Article 6 TEU. The ECJ 
also uses as guidelines 'international treaties for the protection of 
human rights on which the Member States have collaborated or of 
which they are signatories'." The ECJ 'has consistently held that 
all sources of fundamental rights support the existence of a strong 
priilciplz of equality and non-di~crimination'.~~ 
Secondly, the principle of equality is wider than the principle of 
equal treatment and could include measures pcrfoming the second 
and third functions and thus aiming for Inore substantive or pluralist 
concepts of equality. The need to go beyond the prevention of 
unequal treatment is now recognised at the EU level, as is clear 
from a ~o rn inun ica t i on~~  and the Proposal for an European Year 
of Equal. Opportunities for ~ 1 1 , ' ~  which both came out in June 
2005. These papers acknowledge that positive action Inay be 
necessary to coxnpensate for the structural barriers and long-stand- 
ing and deep-rooted inequalities that some groups experience. 
They also stress the importance of social. inclusion and the 'need to 
develop appropriate responses to the different needs of new migrants, 
established minorities of immigrant origin and otller minority 
groupsq. j" 
Four problems were identified in relation to the concept of 
formal equality. The first one was. that it. required a comparator 
and that this was a ma~lipulatisie notion as the choice of comparator 
could iilfluei~ce the outcome. However, the words "ould be' in the 
indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently 
neutl-a1 provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial 
l 
or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other 
persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively 
justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are 
appropriate and necessary. 
l! 
In this, the Race Directive goes beyond a notion of foimal equality 
, ,  towards a substantive equallty concept, because indirect discrimina- 
tion takes accolmt of the disparate impact equal treatment can have 
on certain groups, or in other words, it takes account of the result of 
equal treatment. 
In its provision for positive action in the already mentioned 
Article 5, the Race Directive also shows a more substantive equality 
concept. The Race Directive can thus be said to move towards per- 
formins the second f~~nc t ion  of equality distinguished by Fredman. 
' 1  i definition of direct discriminatim in Article 2(2)(a) of the Race 
l i /  Directive seem to suggest that a hypothetical comparator can be 
1 1  accepted,39 although the ECJ has rejected such a comparator in sex discriinination cases except in cases of discrimination on grounds of pregnancy. This situation might have changed, however, because the two new Gender Directives contain the same definition, including , the words 'would be'. In many cases or  direct discrimination, it will i 8 / .  be easier to find a hypothetical comparator and hopefully the EC-T 
# I  I #  will indeed allow its use for discrimination on all Article 13 EC 
' l , ' :  grounds including sex. 
Another problem with the concept of formal equality is, as 
l mentioned, that it is a relative concept, and that equal treatment 
I :  can be achieved by levelling-up or by levelling-down. However, 
under the Race and the other new Equality Dii-ectives, equal 
treatment can no longer be achieved by limiting or taking away 
existing benefits, as the non-regression clause is a clear 'prohibition 
on levelling-down7.'0 
I i The third problem with the notion of formal equality is that it 
# ~ l  negates the value of difference and leaves no room for a requirement 
I ' I  that people should be treated appropriately according to their 
l '  differences. The fourth problem is chat formal equality ignores any 
1 ~ existins inequalities and social disadvantages created by past discri- 
mination and is not interested in the outcome or result. The Race 
Directive deals with this in two ways: it prohibits indirect discrimina- 
tion and it allow-S Member States to take positive action measures to 
prevent or compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic 
origin. 
The Race Directive defines indirect discrimination in Article 
2(2 j(b): 
Ebwever, $his ixove is rather tentative in that indirect discl-imination is 
not always against the law, because of the possibility of justification. 
For example, business interests could be taken to justify a practice 
which indirectly discriminates against persoils from certain racial or 
ethnic origins. I11 this the Race Directive follows most national and 
international provisions against indirect discrimination wlich allow 
for justjfication and, therefore, the definition should not be changed. 
The ECJ could play a role in ensuring that Member States do not over- 
step the margin of appreciation given by the definition. 
The move towards substantive equality made by the provision 
I'or positive action is also tentative, for two reasons. Firstly, Article 
5 permits Member States to take positive action measures, but 
does not put a duty on them to do so. Secondly, there are limitations 
on what positive action is allowed if the ECJ follows its own case law 
in sex discrimination cases. 
The move towards perfonning the second of Fredman's func- 
tions, could be made much stronger if the Race Directive would 
require Member States to take positive action like Article 2(2) of 
the ICERD does. Article 5 could also move towards pedorming 
the third f~~nction by followi~lg paragraph 5 of the General Recom- 
mendation No. 7 of ECRI" and requiring Member States to adopt 
specific lncasures not only to prevent or conlpensate for disadvaa- 
tages, but also to promote the full participation of disadvantaged 
groups in all fields of life. 
As mentioned, the Race Directive does not indicate what sort of 
actions are permissible under Article 5. It is suggested that this is as it 
should be, as it is difficult to go into details in an EU measure like a 
Directive. It will thus be up to the ECJ to decide what is permissible. 
The ECJ has limited positive action measures for women to measures 
that einbody an equality of opportunity concept. Will. the ECJ follow 
this interpretation for discrimination based on racial or ethnic 
origin'? On the one hand, there might be some room to allow for a 
broader interpretation because, firstly, the case law of the ECJ is 
partly based on its interpretation of Article 2(4) of the Equal Treat- 
ment Directive, but this Article 11as beein deleted by the Gender 
Amendment Dil-e~tive.~' 
Secondly, there might be some room foi- a broader interpreta- 
tion in the case of racial or ethnic origin disci-imination because 
the scope of the Race Directive goes beyond the employment field. 
The ECJ might decide to allow broader positive action measures in 
tlle other areas covered. Support for this can be found in the 
Lor77r7zer.s case" iin which the ECJ upheld an employer's schelne 
that provided subsidised nursery places only for [emale einployees 
(save in exceptional circumstances). And, thirdly, as S ~ h i e k ~ ~  
argues, the text of the Race and Framewol-lr Directives point to a 
more result-oriented appi-oazli. Both Directives allow for positive 
measures 'with a view t o  ensuring full equality in  practice', which 
appears t o  indicate that these Directives are aiming for equality of 
results. Schiek writes: 
Neither of the directives thus uses the tern1 'equal opportunity' from 
the old Gender Equality Directive, which led both Advocates General 
Tesauro and Jacobs in their conclusions on Murschall and Knlnnlce 
respectively to assume that positive action measures aiming at results 
are inadmissible. On the contrary, aiming to 'ensure full equality in 
practice', the directives appear to envisage result-oriented as well as 
procedural measures. 
O n  the other hand, some authors argue that the text of Article 
141(4) E C  is wider than that of the Race D i r e ~ t i v e . ~ ~  Waddington 
and Bell anticipate 'that the Court  will seek to extend these general 
principles on positive action [from the sex discrilnination cases]. to  
the other grounds of discrimination enumerated in Article 13 EC', 
although they do  admit that 'there remains a variety of positive 
action schemes that have yet t o  be tested'.46 T l~e re  might thus be 
some scope for a broader interpretation. 
An argument could also be made for allowing the Member 
States some discretion in deciding how far these measures should 
go. In the Lonzr~zers case, the ECJ  held that: 
in determining the scope of any derogation from an individual righl 
such as the equal treatment or men and women laid down by the 
Directive [Article 2(4) Equal Treatment Directive 19763, due regard 
must be had to the principle of proportionality, which requires that 
derogations must remain withn the limits of what is appropriate 
and necessary in order to achieve the aim in view and that the principle 
of equal treatment be reconciled as far as possible with the require- 
ments of the aims p~r sued . "~  
This case law could be laid down in the Directive by adding the 
following sentence a t  the end of Article 5: 'provided these measures 
remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in 
order t o  achieve that aim'. As Poiares ~ a d u r o ~ ~  writes: 
It cannot be excluded that the I-eference in Article 141 EC to com- 
peiisatory measures has as its ainl providing a broader marsin of 
discretion to Member States in adopting lneasilres of positive discrimi- 
nation. The issue here for the ECJ, and the decision that it has to take 
regarding admissibility of affirmative action and positive discrimina- 
tion measures adopted by the Member States, is not actually whether 
affirmative action is the best way to fight discrimillation and to 
reinstate equality in the labour market, but whether to give Member 
States a margin of discretion to decide what is compatible with the 
principle of equality. . . . In my view, in an area such as this that is 
subject to intense discussioll and scrutiny, it ]nay be appropriate for- 
the court to allow for some diversity of national political choice 
regarding the extent to which Menlber States adopt affirmative 
actioil n~easures. 
Allowing the Member States some discretion as to how far these 
measures can go, provided these measures remain within tlie linnits 
of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve tlne ainn of 
ensuring full equality in practice, will allow Member States some 
freedom to go beyond mere measures of the equality of opportunity 
model and use measures of the equality of results model, but with an 
opportunity for scrutiny by the ECJ. This might lead t o  the develop- 
ment of some interesting and innovative measures that could be used 
as examples of good practice for other Member States. I t  might also 
help to extend the boundaries of what the ECJ will accept as per- 
mitted positive action, not only under the Race Directive, but also 
under the other Equality Directives. 
Another change that would move the Race Directive further 
towards performing Fredman's second and third functions would be 
to  add a mainstreaming duty. The Race Directive (and the Framework 
Directive) could follow the Gender Amendment Directive which adds 
the following parapaph to Article 1 of the Equal Treatment Directive: 
Member States shall actively take into account the objective of 
equaIity between nlen and women when formulating and implement- 
ing laws, regulations, administrative provisions, policies and activities 
in the areas referred to in paragraph 1. 
There appears to be no reason why this duty should oiily exist in 
relation to gender equality and not to the other grounds of Article 
13 EC. Indeed, the Draft Constitution T;or Europe extends the duty 
to those other g ~ - o u n d s , ~ ~  although it is 1101 sure whether the Constitu- 
tion in its present form will ever come into force. It  would, therefore, be 
better to add the duty to the Race and Framework Directives. 
Changes in Relation to the Scope 
The extensive material scope of the Race Directive, going beyond the 
enlploynlent sphere, is to be welcomed, but the meaning of 'within 
the limits of the powers confen-ed upon the Cornrnunity' i n  both 
Article 13 EC and Article 3(1) is not clear. However, it could be 
that the legislator meant to leave this rather vague because a more 
detailed description would be more restrictive. The ECJ will lliost 
likely follow the view of most leading coinmentators that this 
phrase means that the power is subject to the limits of the existing 
Cornlnunity competencies, as the view that it: provides the necessary 
powers, where these are iacking, for measures to be taken, might 
overstep the dividing line between the competences of the Commu- 
nity and those of the Member States and so infringe the pl-inciples 
of subsidiarity and proportionality. . . 
The personal scope of the Race Directive is, again, not very 
clear. The Directive appears to apply to non-EU natioilals and 
thus protects them against racial and ethnic origin discrimination, 
except in relation to immigration laws or other legal acts covering 
entry, residence and legal status. It is clear from the negotiations 
on the proposed scopejO that this is a very sensitive area as it touches 
on a State's sovereignty and the division of powers between the 
Member States and the Union. Article 3(2) appears, however, to 
be very broad in scope and could be used to deny third country 
nationals protection in a very wide range of discriminatory situa- 
tions. Two possible ways of building in safeguards for the protection 
of third country nationals can be found in the ICERD and the Race 
Directive could follow either of these. Articles l(2) ICERD deter- 
mines that 'this Convention shalI not apply to distinctions, exclu- 
sions, restrictions or preferences made by States Parties to this 
Collvention between citizens and non-citizens7. The Committee on 
the EIimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 
the body that oversees the implementation of the ICERD, has 
brought out a General Recommendation on discrimination against 
non-citi~ens.'~ Point l(4) determines: 
Under the Convention, differential treatment based on citizenship or 
i~nmigration status will constitute discrimination if the criteria For 
suck differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes 
of thc Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and 
are not proportional to the achievement of this aim. 
Therefore, under the ICERD, differential treatment of non-citizens 
will be considered to be discrimination, unless it is objectively 
justified. A similar objective justification test could be added to 
Article 3 of the Race Directive. This would also cover the police, 
law enforcement officials, border control officials, and the army 
and prison personnel in all their activities, including law enforce- 
ment. They could use the exceptions of Article 3(2) as ions as that 
use was objectively justified. It would build in an objective test, 
which could be scrutinised by the courts. 
The other alternative would be to follow Article l(3) ICERD, 
which states: 
Nothing in this Convention luay be interpreted as affecting in any way 
thc legal provisions of State Parties concerning nationality, citizenship 
or naturalization, provided that such provisions do not discriminate 
against any particular nationality. 
v- 
L he first aiternative wouid provide stl-onger PI-otection, but both 
alter~latjves would improve the protectioi~ for third country 
nationals and would be more in line with Recital 3 of the Prea~iible 
to the Race Directive. If the second alternative was followed. the 
suggestion of the European Parliament to add 'the exercise by ally 
public body, including police, immigration, criminal and civil justice 
authorities, of its functions'," might be useful to take away all doubt 
about whether these bodies and functions are covered. 
Other Changes 
The Framework Directive contains a duty on employers to make 
reasonable acconlmodation for disabled persons unless such 
measures would impose a disproportionate burden on them. This 
duty could also be useful for other grounds of dis~riminat ion.~~ 
For example, allowing for alternatives to uniforms or other clothiilg 
and head gear, pl-oviding a place and time for religious worship, and 
adapting the (work) environment and adjusting patterns of working 
time for elderly or disabled people could all be seen as rnalcing 
reasonable accommodation. It is, therefore, suggested to extend 
the duty in the Framework Directive beyond disability. If, as was 
suggested, religion or belief are added to the grounds of discrimina- 
tion prohibited in the Race Directive, then the duty to make reasoii- 
able accommodation should also be included in that Directive. A 
similar Recital to Recital 21 of the Framework Directive should 
then also be added. This Recital suggests what should be taken 
into accouilt to decide whether a measure would impose a dispropor- 
tionate burden: the financial and other costs entailed, the scale and 
fiilancial resources of tlne organization or undertaking and the 
possibility to obtain public funding or any other assistance. 
'Health and safety' might also be mentioned. 
According to the general rule of Coinmunity law, it is for the I 
i~atioilal law of the Member States to provide remedies to protect i 
rights derived from Comlnunity law and to deternline wliat sanctions 
should be made available. The EU can, therefore, not give very 
detailed provisions, because this would be contrary to the principles 
of subsidiarity and proportionality. Therefore, no changes are 
proposed to the provisions on remedies and sai~ctiox~s. 1 
No changes are suggested in relation to the tasks of the body or l ! 
bodies of Article 13 of the Directiveias it is clear that the list of tasks 
is 11011-exhaustive. According to the Explanatory Memoi-anduin to l 
-the Proposal for the Directive, the proposal establishes a nunnber i 
of lilinimurn requirements for such independent bodies, but I l 
Member States are free to decide on the structure and f ~ ~ ~ ~ c t i o n i n g  / 
of such bodies in accordance with their legal traditions and policy 
c l ~ o i c e s . ~ ~   he negotiations on the Directive show, that providing 
for more extensive competenccs for these bodies was seen as over- 
stepping 'the line between setting objectives and telling Member 
States how to achieve them (so colltravening the principle of 
s~bsidiar i ty) ' .~~ Leaving the Member States some discretion as to 
the tasks to be given to these bodies might also lead to some interest- 
ing developments. 
CONCLUSION 
Changes to be made to the Race Directive have been suggested with 
the aim of making it into a more effective legislative measure in the 
fight against racism and ralcial discriminatioil in the EU. The major 
points of criticism specifically raised against the Race Directive were, 
firstly, with regards to the grounds of discrimination, that it puts 
racial and ethn~c ongin at the top of the hierarchy of discrimination 
grounds and that it omits 'religion or belief' from the protected 
grounds; secondly, with regards to the concept of equality that it 
mainly aims for a notion of formal equality and does not really go 
very far towards other concepts of equality; and, thirdly, that the pro- 
tection it provides for third country nationals appears to be limited. 
As all Equality Directives contain the same non-regression 
clause and thus prohibit levelling-down, the Race Directive itself 
does not need ally changes to deal with the hierarchy as the protec- 
tion against discrimination on the grounds of' racial or ethnic 
origin is already stronger than that against discrimination on the 
other Article 13 EC grounds. To deal with the hierarchy, the protec- 
tion provided by the other Equality Directives could be 'levelled-up' 
to the same level as that provided by the Race Directive. 
The suggestion to add 'religion and belief' to the grounds 
covered by the Race Directive responds to the second point of 
criticisnl mentioned in relation to the grounds of discrimination. 
Even if the level of protection provided by the Framework Directive 
would be extended to cover all areas covered by the Race Directive, 
'religion or belief' should still be added to the grounds in the Race 
Directive, because that would avoid having to make a distinction 
between racial and ethnic origin on the one hand and religion or 
belief on the other hand. Perpetrators do, indeed, not often make 
such a clear distinction either. 
In relation to the concept of equality, the premise was that equality 
in all its concepts or, in other words, equality performing all Fredman's 
functions, is needed to combat racism and racial discrimination. To 
move the Race Directive further towards substantive and pluralist 
coilc~pts of eqzality, the'fellowing char~ges were suggested: firstly, 
the title and purpose of the Directive should be to implement the 
principle of equality, rather than the principle of equal treatment. 
Secondly, the provisions for positive action should be made 
compulsory, like they are under the ICERD. 'I~lnirdly, positive 
action should be required not only to pi-event 01- conlpensate for dis- 
advantages, but also to promote full participation of disadvantaged 
groups in all fields of life. Fourthly, the Member States should be 
given some discretion in relation to positive action measures. And, 
lastly, a mainstreaming duty like the one in the Gendei- Ainendxment 
Directive should be added to the Race Directive. 
Suggestions for changes to Article 3(2) of the Race Directive 
have been made to ensure that the exception in this article is not 
used to deny third country nationals protection. The first suggestion 
was to add a proportionality or objective justificatioi~ test to the 
second paragraph, while the second one added a proviso. Both 
suggestions were based on the ICERD and the interpretation of 
that Convention as given by the CERD. 
The time is ripe to suggest changes to the Race Directive, 
because the Coininission is currently working on its five year 
report on the applicatioil of the Directive undei- Article 17 and on 
the feasibility study on possible new measures to complemei~t he 
current legal framework, announced in the 2005 Co inm~nica t ion .~~  
This paper is meant to contribute to the discussion on possible 
changes to the Race Directive. 
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